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EUTHANASIA:

THE PHYSICIAN'S LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

The term "euthanasia" is derived from a combination of two
Greek words: eu, which means happy or normal, and thanatos,
which means death. Its equivalent colloquialism is "mercy-killing." However, any attempt to define euthanasia in terms of
word origins merely scratches the surface. Today the word is
used to describe a myriad of situations which differ widely in nature and legal consequence. These differing situations often overlap, and the distinctions between the various "forms" of euthanasia frequently become blurred.
Generally, euthanasia involves the killing, by acts or
omissions, of a person suffering from a terminal illness or
injury.' From this general statement, euthanasia is often "subdivided" into various "forms" based on the nature of the act or
omission involved, and the presence or absence of the victim's
consent. 2 Thus, active euthanasia necessitates an affirmative
act which results in the patient's death3 while passive euthanasia
occurs when the physician (or another) takes no affirmative
measures to save or prolong the patient's life. 4 Voluntary
euthanasia involves some form of consent by the patient or
another acting on the patient's behalf to the act or non-act
resulting in death) while involuntary euthanasia occurs without
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 654 (4th ed. 1968):

The act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering
from incurable and distressing disease.
Euthanasia may be performed in a number of ways; the physician
may affirmatively inject air or a lethal drug into the patient's blood
stream, a life-saving operation may not be performed upon the patient,
or a respirator or other life support mechanism sustaining the patient
may be disconnected.
2. See Symposium-Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1975); Louisell, Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 22 CATH. U.L.
REV. 723 (1973); Note, Euthanasia-TheIndividual's Right to Freedom of
Choice, 5 SUFFOLK L. REV. 190 (1970).
3. What constitutes an "affirmative act"? While most authorities
will agree that a physician who injects a lethal drug into the patient's
blood stream acts affirmatively, there is considerable disagreement
whether the physician "acts" by unplugging the patient's respirator.

See

Cannon, The Right to Die, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 654 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Cannon]; Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Fletcher].
4. But see Vodiga, Euthanasia and the Right to Die-Moral, Ethical
and Legal Perspectives, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1974). Mr. Vodiga distinguishes between euthanasia and "letting death occur." Thus, the physician who would fail to employ treatment designed to prolong the patient's life, whereafter the patient died of his affliction, would not have
committed euthanasia at all. Most writers today would identify this situation as a form of passive euthanasia. See Cannon and Fletcher note

3 supra.

5. Should third party consent be considered "voluntary," or should
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the consent of the patient or another." These seemingly clearcut distinctions become blurred when they appear in combined
form; for example, the patient may "consent" not to be given
a life-saving operation (voluntary-passive), or he may be injected
with a fatal drug without his consent (involuntary-active).
Between these two extremes exist other combinations, all of
7
which add to the complexity of the situation.
Also to be considered is the use or non-use of extraordinary
treatment to prolong the patient's life. Extraordinary treatment
is defined as medicine, operations, or other treatment which
cannot be obtained and employed without considerable expense,
pain or other inconvenience, and which provide no reasonable
hope of lasting benefit to the patient.8 A physician who accepts
and treats a patient has a duty to use ordinary means to preserve
his patient's life, but there is no corollary duty to employ extraordinary means.9
The physician plays a major role in the euthanasia decision. 10 He diagnoses the patient's affliction, evaluates the
patient's condition and arrives at a professional opinion as to the
seriousness of that condition. He prescribes the necessary treatment to be given the patient and acts as a consultant and advisor
to the patient and those intimately involved with him. Furthermore, the physician is often directly involved in the act or nonact which results in the terminal patient's death.
For his role in the euthanasia decision, the physician may
be subject to both criminal and civil liability. An important consideration in assessing the physician's liability in this area
involves the standard of care the physician owes his patient.
This standard requires the physician to possess the knowledge
and skill possessed by an average physician in the community,
In
and to exercise reasonable care in the use of that skill."
Illinois, the courts have said:
'The duty which the defendant, as a physician . . . owed to the
patient, was to bring to the case . . . that degree of knowledge,
this term apply only to the patient's consent?

See text accompanying

note 140 infra.

6. See note 2 supra.

7. Other situations could involve involuntary-passive euthanasia,
where the patient's life support systems are ended without his consent;

or voluntary-active, where the patient consents to affirmative acts which
end his life.

8. See Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice
of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Foreman].

9. Id.
10. See Teel, The Physician's Dilemma, 27 BAYLOR L. Rv. 6 (1975);
Williamson, Should the Patient Be Kept Alive? 44 MFD. EcON. 63 (1967).
11. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
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. . . would bring to a
skill and care which a good physician
12

similar case under like circumstances.'

The court went on to explain this standard:
'While this rule, on the one hand, does not exact the highest
degree of skill and proficiency attainable in the profession, it
does not, on the other hand, contemplate merely average merit.'"
A recurring consideration is whether this standard of care is
being met as the physician interacts with his terminal patient.
This article will examine the physician's role in the euthanasia decision in the context of the liability to which the
physician is exposed because of this role. What defenses are
available to the physician? Does the particular "form" of
euthanasia involved make a difference in assessing his liability?
As a practical matter, what are the chances that a physician will
be held liable in a euthanasia situation? Answers to these questions will be suggested through an analysis of the present law in
this area. Proposed statutes to liberalize the law on euthanasia,
together with the policy reasons behind such proposed legislation,
and the counter-arguments thereto, will be examined.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In Illinois, the statute defining murder states:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
or he
that individual ...
(1) he either intends to kill ...
knows that such acts create a strong probability of death . . . to

that person ....

14

At common law, murder was considered to be the act of killing
a person with malice aforethought. 5 "Malice" was not used
in the ordinary sense as meaning hatred or ill-will, but rather
in the legal sense of the intent to kill or the knowledge that
the act performed would probably cause death. 6 North Carolina
v. Tilley 17 offers the following succinct statement of the principle:
Malice is not only hatred, ill-will, or spite, as it is ordinarily
understood, but it also means that condition of mind which
prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally without just cause, excuse, or justification.' 8
150

12. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 Ill. App. 3d 672, 678, 303 N.E.2d.146,
(1973), citing Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 536, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
13. Id.
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1976).

15. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
PERKINS].

27 (2d ed. 1969)

16. Id.
17. 18 N.C. App. 300, 196 S.E.2d 816 (1973).
18. Id. at 302, 196 S.E.2d at 818.

[hereinafter cited as
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When it has been established that the defendant had the requisite
mental state and performed the act without lawful justification, 19 the legal elements for murder have been satisfied. That
which induced the defendant to act is immaterial; thus, the fact
that the defendant may have acted out of sympathy toward his
victim is of no legal consequence as regards his criminal liability.
The cases in Illinois and elsewhere agree that motive is not an
20
essential element of the crime.
From the above analysis, it is clear that a physician who
performs euthanasia upon a patient is, under strict legal terminology, liable for murder. He intends by his acts to end the
life of the patient, and any feeling of sympathy he may exhibit
in performing the acts is not a material factor in determining
his criminal liability. Equally unavailing as a legal defense is
the physician's belief that he is morally justified in his actions
since "he nonetheless acts with malice if he is able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless of his personal
21
belief."
Consent
In voluntary euthanasia situations, the patient's consent to
the act of euthanasia is of no legal assistance to the physician
seeking to escape criminal liability for his act. The law is settled
22
that the victim's consent is no defense to the crime of murder.
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between active and
passive euthanasia. 23 The settled law which states that consent
is no defense to murder may be readily applied to active
euthanasia as, for example, when the physician injects his patient
with a lethal drug. However, the law is not as readily applicable to certain forms of passive euthanasia. Acts of omission
by a physician resulting in the death of his patient render the
physician criminally liable only when the physician is under a
legal duty to act. 24 Once the physician-patient relationship
commences, the physician is subject to a legal duty to continue
treatment, barring an agreement limiting such treatment, as long
19. A homicide committed in self-defense is justifiable. See
supra note 15.

PERKINS,

20. People v. Mangano, 375 fli. 72, 30 N.E.2d 428 (1940).
21. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 918, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 822 (1966).
22. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908),

where the defendant shot and killed his girl friend after she had pleaded
with him for several months to kill her. Defendant's conviction of murder was upheld. See also People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690

(1920), where the victim's husband had placed a glass of poison within
the reach of his invalid wife, who later picked it up and drank it, fully
aware of its contents. Held: It is murder to aid and abet a suicide.
23. See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
24. See Foreman, note 8 supra.
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as the case requires attention; the physician must exercise reasonable skill and care in determining whether his care can be
properly and safely terminated. 25 Thus, during the treatment
period the physician is under a legal duty to act in the patient's
interests, and his failure to so act may subject him to criminal liability.
In some jurisdictions, a patient may refuse to consent to the
initiation of life-saving treatment, in which case the physician
will not be held criminally liable for his failure to act. In re
Estate of Brook 26 is a good example. There, the patient, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, refused blood transfusions necessary to save her life. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
patient's refusal would be honored:
In the final analysis, what has happened here involves a judicial
attempt to decide what course of action is best for a particular
individual, notwithstanding that individual's contrary views
based upon religious convictions.
Such action cannot be constitu27
tionally countenanced.
By refusing life-saving treatment, the patient has essentially
absolved the physician of his legal duty to act, and it has been
shown that absent this duty, no criminal liability will attend the
28
physician's omission.

What Is Death and When Does It Occur?
An essential element of murder is that the criminal agency
of the defendant cause the victim's death. A person cannot be
convicted of the murder of another who is already dead at the
time of the act.2 9 Thus twin problems arise: what is death,
and when does it occur?
Black's Law Dictionary defines death as:
The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians
as a total stoppage of the circulation of the. blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such
as respiration, pulsation ....30
Most earlier cases followed this definition verbatim, 31 and some
specifically rejected the recognition of "brain death" as a viable
legal concept, holding that "a body is not dead so long as there
is a heart beat .... This is so though the brain may have quit
25. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
26. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).

27. Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
28. See text accompanying note 24 supra.

29. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE

1957).

§

189, at 435 (And. ed.

30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968).
31. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (1961); Smith v.

Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
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functioning. ' 32 However, in recent years a number of state legis33
latures have heeded the arguments of brain death proponents
and have passed statutes legally recognizing this form of death
for all or limited purposes. In essence, these statutes provide two
definitions of death: the absence of spontaneous respiratory and
cardiac functioning (similar to the common law definition of
death), and in the alternative, the absence of spontaneous brain
functioning.3 4 Representative of the states which have enacted
such legislation, Kansas35" and Maryland 36 provide for a broad application of the brain death definition which covers most in3 7
stances where the occurrence of death is at issue. Virginia
adopts the definition in The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, but
explicitly indicates that it is applicable elsewhere. Many states,
on the other hand, including Illinois, confine the meaning of
brain death to those situations arising under The Uniform Ana38
tomical Gift Act only.
The importance of these statutes to the physician in respect
to the euthanasia situation is significant. If the patient's EEG
is no longer active, indicating a cessation of brain functioning,
the patient may be pronounced legally dead, even though his
heart is still beating. In this situation, the physician who
unplugs the patient's respirator (which may be allowing his heart
and lungs to continue functioning) and thereby hastens death,
will escape criminal liability for his actions.
PracticalAspects of Criminal Liability
Aside from considerations of consent and legal death, the
probability of a physician being held criminally liable for an act
of euthanasia is of concern. Although it appears that euthanasia,
especially in passive form, is frequently practiced, 39 only once
has a conviction of murder resulted therefrom. 40 In other
32. Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (1952).
33. See Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112
Fletcher,supra note 3.

(1964);

34. See also Friloux, Death, When Does It Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
10 (1975); Biorck, When Is Death?, 18 Wis. L. REV. 494 (1968).
35. KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 2, § 77-202 (Supp. 1975).
36. MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 54F (Supp. 1975).
37. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 19.2, § 32-364.3:1 (Supp. 1976).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 552 (Supp. 1976).
39. Levisohn, Voluntary Mercy Deaths, 8 J. FOR. MED. 57 (1961). Mr.
Levisohn conducted a survey of 250 Chicago area internists and surgeons;
156 replied and 61% of those who answered felt that "physicians do actually practice euthanasia in instances of incurable adult sufferers." Id. at
68.
40. John Noxon was convicted of first degree murder for killing his
six-month old mongoloid son. His death sentence was later commuted
to six years imprisonment, and he was paroled after serving four years.
Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 (1946). For a discussion of this case see Survey-Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitu-
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known cases involving "mercy-killers," there have been three
convictions of a lesser crime, 4 1 seven acquittals and one failure
42
to indict.
These statistics tend to show that although a physician or
other "mercy-killer" may be legally liable for murder, his chances
of being convicted are slight. A number of reasons account for
this result. First, if the case is being tried by a jury, it is
unlikely that a conviction will result, or if there is a conviction,
43
From the example
it is unlikely that it will be for murder.
44
it appears that
afforded by the majority of euthanasia cases,
juries are reluctant to return a verdict of guilty against a defendant who kills out of kindness or sympathy toward his victim.
It appears simply contrary to human nature to punish the
45
One "tactic"
"mercy-killer" to the fullest extent of the law.
of juries searching for ways to be lenient with the "mercy-killer"
is to find the defendant temporarily insane at the time of the
death. 46 Second, there are problems of causation. Because the
act of euthanasia is most often performed outside the view of
any witnesses, it is difficult to prove the physician's criminal
47
In situations where the
agency as the cause of the death.
life
support treatment, there
patient's
physician disconnects the
the physician's act but
not
it
is
is the further argument that
causes death.48
actually
which
rather the patient's affliction
Third, due to the foregoing reasons, and also because public sentiLAW. 1202, 1213-14
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Survey].
41. See Repouille v. U.S., 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947), where a father
used chloroform to kill his 13 year old son, who had been physically and
mentally deformed since birth. The jury, upon an indictment for firstdegree murder, returned a verdict of second-degree manslaughter, and
father received a suspended sentence of five to ten years imprisonment.
42. For a discussion of these cases see Survey, supra note 40. See
also Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLO. L. REV. 178, 184-86
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Williams] for the recorded trial transcript of
a case which resulted in the acquittal of a man charged with the murder
of his invalid wife. People v. Werner, Crim. No. 58-3636 (Cook Co. Ill.
1959). The trial judge stated:
Courts don't usually condone mercy-killings, but ... I think a jury
This is a
would not be inclined to return a verdict of guilty ....
time in one's life when a good reputation and decency pay off. I
can't find it in my heart to find you guilty.
43. See, e.g., Repouille v. U.S., 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) and Williams, supra note 42.
44. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
45. Thus, while motive is technically neither an element of nor a defense to murder, see text accompanying note 20 supra, it emerges as a
strong practical consideration in any attempt to convict the "mercykiller."
46. See Note, Euthanasia-The Individual's Right to Freedom of
Choice, 5 SUFFOLK L. REV. 190, 201 (1970). See also State v. Zygmaniak,
No. 1197-72 (Super. Ct. Monmouth Co., N.J., 1973).
47. See Williams, supra note 42.
48. See Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Life-Saving Treatment, 53
CALiF. L. REV. 860 (1965).

tional and Legislative Considerations,48 NoTRE DAME
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ment is usually on the side of the "mercy-killer," prosecutors
recognize the slight chances for convictions and rarely initiate
49
prosecution.
THE QUINLAN CASE
A recent development in the law of euthanasia is the case
In re Quinlan.5 0 In mid-April of 1975, Karen Quinlan lapsed
into a coma during which she stopped breathing for two fifteen
minute periods. She was taken to a hospital and put on a
respirator to aid her breathing. 51 Subsequent tests conducted
on Miss Quinlan determined that she did have some brain stem
function and other reaction to external stimuli, 52 but that she
was existing in a "chronic persistent vegetative state."53 Nearly
one year later the matter was brought before the New Jersey
Supreme Court, after Karen's father had unsuccessfully petitioned a lower court for authorization to terminate the respirator
treatment. 54 The supreme court reviewed Miss Quinlan's condition and found that: (1) severe brain damage had occurred,
leaving her in a chronic and persistent vegetative state; (2) medical science could afford no reasonable expectation of a cure for
her condition; (3) the respirator treatment merely prevented a
rapid deterioration of her condition; and (4) if the respirator
were removed, she would die in a short time.55
Even under these circumstances, Miss Quinlan's attending
physician refused to disconnect the respirator, stating that existing medical standards would not permit discontinuance of any
treatment necessary to sustain a patient's life.56 The lower
court upheld this contention, and Mr. Quinlan appealed to the
New Jersey Supreme Court, seeking to be appointed legal
guardian of his daughter with judicial authorization to disconnect
her respirator. 57
49. See note 45 supra.

50. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
51. Miss Quinlan's physician diagnosed the breathing disorder as

anoxia (lack of oxygen in the bloodstream), a disorder caused by a neu-

rological abnormality which severely limited Karen's respiratory functions. The respirator was necessary, in the physician's view, to assist the
respiratory functions and help ward off infection in other parts of
Karen's system.
52. From this data, physicians agreed that Karen was not "brain
dead."
53. 70 N.J. 10, 25, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976).
54. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975).

55. The findings were made after the court had received testimony

from Karen's attending physician and other experts who had studied her
case history.

56. See text accompanying note 11 supra. See also text accompanying note 85 infra for a further discussion of this aspect of the case.
57. 70 N.J. 10, 22, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (1976).
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The Court'sDecision and Reasoning
The New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with numerous
8
issues, several of which are outside the scope of this discussion."
The critical issue before the court was whether Karen's father
or physician could terminate her life-support mechanisms without being subject to civil or criminal liability. Deciding this
question in the affirmative, the court appointed Mr. Quinlan
legal guardian of his daughter's person and property, 59 and authorized him to disconnect the respirator if (1) Karen's family
concurred in the decision; (2) her attending physician concluded
that there was no reasonable expectation of her recovery; and
(3) a hospital "Ethics Committee" ° was consulted and agreed
with the physician's prognosis.
The court reasoned that Karen could, in the free exercise
of her right of privacy, 61 effectively request that her respirator2
be disconnected. Furthermore, since Karen was incompetent,C
the court concluded that her right of privacy could be asserted
by her father as legal guardian. 63 The state's interest in the
preservation of human life would not bar the assertion of Karen's
right of privacy because of the severity of Karen's condition:
We think that the State's interest [in the preservation of life]
as the degree
weakens and the individual's right of privacy grows
64
of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
To determine the validity of the physician's contention that
the removal of the respirator would offend traditional medical
standards, the court reviewed the applicability of those standards
to terminal patients. It is noted that physicians as a matter of
policy do not initiate respiratory treatment on hopelessly afflicted patients who have stopped breathing thus refusing to pro58. The court held, inter alia, that Mr. Quinlan had a sufficient adverse interest in the controversy to have standing. The court also held
that free exercise of religion was not a basis for disconnecting the respirator, since acts pursuant to religious beliefs are not wholly immune
rom government restraint. Also, Karen's condition did not constitute
"cruel and unusual punishment" since that term applies only to criminal
sanctions. Although Karen's condition could be termed "cruel and unusual" the court held that it was not "punishment" as the word is legally
understood. Id. at 34-38, 355 A.2d 647, 660-62.
59. There was some dispute as to whether guardianship should be bifurcated, and whether Mr. Quinlan appointed guardian of only the property of his daughter. The court rejected this argument. 70 N.J. 10, 53,
355 A.2d 647, 670-71 (1976).
60. 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (1976). The concept of an "Ethics
Committee" is discussed at length in Teel, The Physician's Dilemma, 27
BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975). The committee would normally consist of physicians, attorneys, theologians, and hospital administrators.

61. The right was first discussed in 1890 in an article co-authored by
Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter cited as Brandeis].
62. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
63. 70 N.J. 10, 28, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
64. Id.
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long the life of a terminal patient where such prolongation would
serve no humane benefit.65 Such a practice was found to be in
accordance with medical standards and could be analogized to
the discontinuance of respiratory treatment as well. The court
was careful to point out that the respirator was extraordinary
means of treatment,66 and that it would not improve or cure
Karen's condition; under these circumstances it would not offend
medical standards to terminate such treatment.
The Quinlan case is unique in that it represents the first
instance in which a court has actually approved the discontinuance of life support treatment. Heretofore, judicial involvement
in euthanasia situations had been limited to reviewing the propriety of acts already performed67 and authorizing (or failing to
authorize) the initiation of life-saving treatment. Particularly
significant aspects of the ruling include the court's discussion of
the right of privacy, its treatment of existing medical standards,
and the effect of the ruling on the physician's civil and criminal
liability.
The Right of Privacy and Euthanasia
In 1914, Justice Cardozo, then a member of the New York
Court of Appeals, outlined the patient's right to self-determination over his body. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospitals,6 8 Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
It is this concept of selfdone with his own body . . . ."9
Supreme Court sought to
New
Jersey
the
determination that
right of privacy rationale.
the
case
under
Quinlan
invoke in the
Though not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
numerous authorities 70 and courts have determined that a right
of privacy does indeed exist. Griswold v. Connecticut71 found
that the right of privacy exists as a corollary to various specifically enumerated rights. Stanley v. Georgia72 and Olmstead v.
United States, 73 both recognized "the right to be left alone--the
65. Thus, if a terminal cancer patient stopped breathing, the physi-

cian responsible for the patient would not generally initiate cardio-vascular and respiratory treatment, if such treatment would merely revive the
patient for a few days.

66. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.

68. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
69. Id. at 126, 105 N.E. at 93.
70. See Brandeis, supra note 61. See also Doss, on Morals, Privacy,
and the Constitution, 25 MIAMI L. REV. 395 (1975); Ervin, Privacy and the
Constitution,50 N.C.L. REV. 1016 (1972).
71. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

72. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
73. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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most comprehensive of rights and the most valued by civilized
men. '7 4 In Eisenstadtv. Baird,75 the Supreme Court stated:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual. . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person . . .7
Most recently, the decisions of Roe v. Wade77 and Doe v. Bolton78
applied the right of privacy rationale to allow a woman to have
79
an abortion under certain circumstances.

The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan determined that
under particular circumstances, i.e., in the face of a terminal
affliction which offers no hope of reversal, an individual possesses, in effect, a right to die. Such an individual may, in the exercise of his right of privacy, request that life-support treatment
be discontinued. While never specifically referring to the right to
die in its opinion, the concept is implicit in much of the court's
reasoning. For example, the court states:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen
were herself miraculously lucid for an interval . . . and per-

ceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide
upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it
meant the prospect of natural death.8 0
This aspect of the court's holding is founded on sound precedent,"' and appears to be logically based on the right of privacy
reasoning. However, since Karen was incompetent the court was
required to carry its holding one step beyond the individual's
exercise of his right of privacy. The court thus permitted
Karen's father as legal guardian to decide for her whether to
continue the respirator treatment.8 2 In doing so, the court
extended the right of privacy to new legal limits-limits which
may be too expansive. By its very nature, the right of privacy
belongs to the individual. If persons other than the individual
are allowed to assert this right, the term "privacy" must necessarily take on broad, heretofore unarticulated, dimensions.
The most rational explanation for the Quinlan decision is
that the court was striving to achieve what it thought were
the most humane results. It cites no authority to support its
74. Id. at 478.

75. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
76. Id. at 453.
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
79. It appears that the Quinlan court is following a recent trend
started by the cases cited at notes 68-78 supra, to further develop and define the right of privacy.
80. 70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
81. See text accompanying notes 70-79 supra. See also Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right
of Privacy, 17 Amiz L. Rnv. 474 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Delgado].
82. 70 N.J. 10, 42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
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decision to allow Mr. Quinlan to assert his daughter's right of
privacy. Rather, in explaining its decision, the court points out
that its refusal to delegate Karen's right of privacy to her father
would essentially destroy the right altogether; this result, the
83
court feels, is untenable.
Existing Medical Standards

Karen's physician refused to disconnect her respirator
because he felt such action would be contrary to existing medical
standards of care, which forbade the discontinuance of treatment
necessary to preserve the life of a patient, regardless of that
patient's condition. 4 In reevaluating these standards, the Quinlan court felt that the standards should no longer apply to terminal patients who have no hope of recovering.
This appears to be a sound conclusion. The standard of care
to which physicians are held directs them to possess the skill
of an average physician in the community and exercise responsible care in using that skill to treat their patients.8 5 The critical issue, in the context of euthanasia, lies in determining the
exact parameters of the words "treat their patients." Arguably,
"treatment" may involve prolonging a patient's life regardless
of how hopeless his condition, or caring for a patient by affording him a reasonable expectation of curing or improving his condition. The Quinlan court decided that the customary medical
standard of treatment applied in the latter situation, but not the
former. The court buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that
it is common practice of physicians and hospitals not to initiate
treatment upon terminal patients who have stopped breathing.
Thus, the rationale that the initiation of treatment offers no medical benefit to the patient beyond sustaining his life for a short
period of time, may also be applied to the discontinuationof such
86
treatment.
Thus, the Quinlan holding modifies medical standards, although only to a limited extent. The standard to which
physicians. are held still requires that reasonable care be exercised in treating a patient, but no longer requires (at least in
New Jersey) the continuation of treatment for the sole purpose
of prolonging the life of an irreversibly terminal patient.
The Physician'sLiability

There is no doubt that Quinlan will have a profound effect
on the interaction between physicians and their terminal
83. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.

84. See text accompanying note 56 supra.

85. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
86. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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patients. In recent years, the increase of malpractice suits has
left physicians understandably reluctant to openly discontinue
any treatment, even when the patient's condition is irreversibly
terminal. The Quinlan court, responding to the immensely complicated issues involved in this area, outlined a procedure whereby the physician will not be subject to civil or criminal liability
for terminating the extraordinary treatment of his patient.
Civil Liability
Consent by the patient to medical treatment has long been
a defense for the physician faced with civil liability for rendering
that treatment.8 7 Quinlan extends this legal principle to cover
the situation of a patient's consent to termination of life-support
treatment. The holding goes further, however, to consider and
validate a form of "multi-third party consent" involving concurrence by the patient's family, guardian, physician, and hospital
"Ethics Committee." Thus through the "diffusion of professional
responsibility, '8 8 the physician would be protected from civil
liability for discontinuing his terminal patient's extraordinary
treatment.
The procedure outlined by the court should promote discussion of the issues presented by the proposed discontinuation
of treatment, and should result in an informed decision by the
parties involved. From the standpoint of the physician's liability, which is intricately tied to the euthanasia decision, the
multi-third party consent concept has the practical effect of
precluding lawsuits by those who would have standing to contest
the termination of extraordinary treatment.
Criminal Liability
Consent by the patient or third persons is not a defense to
criminal liability.8 9 The Quinlan court found, however, other reasons to conclude that criminal liability would not exist under
the circumstances surrounding the case before it. First, the
patient's death following the disconnection of the respirator
would be a natural result of her affliction rather than the criminal agency of the person who disconnected the respirator.
Secondly, because the court based its decision upon the free exercise of the patient's right of privacy, it followed that no criminal
law could validly punish the exercise of a constitutional right.
More importantly, from the physician's standpoint, the constitu87. See text accompanying note 103 infra.

88. 70 N.J. 10, 49-50, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976). The court adopts this
phraseology and the concept behind it from Dr. Teel's article, supra note

60.

89. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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tional protection is held to extend to anyone who effectuates the
exercise of that right. 90 This follows logically from the reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut.1
Perspective
Quinlan is the first major decision which judicially approves
the discontinuation of life-support treatment. It represents a significant relaxation of prior law in respect to a physician's civil
and criminal liability for his role in the decision to terminate
the treatment. However, there are a number of pivotal facts
in the case which distinguish it from other euthanasia situations
and may thus limit the impact of the case in related areas.
First, Karen was already on the respirator when the case
was brought before the New Jersey Supreme Court. The relief
sought thus involved the discontinuationof treatment, and is distinguishable from situations where a life-ending agent is sought
to be introduced into the patient's body. This latter situation
involves active euthanasia, and is still outside the permissible
92
sphere of the law after Quinlan.
Second, a respirator is an extraordinary form of treatment
when it offers no reasonable hope of a cure for a terminal condition. 9 3 Had the respirator offered a hope of improvement for
Karen, the Quinlan court would obviously not have approved its
disconnection, because such treatment would be deemed ordinary
and required by medical standards.9 4 This raises questions
about the other treatment which Karen was receiving. The court
stated that Karen was getting "excellent" care by a team of
four nurses. She was fed through a nasal-gastro tube and
checked regularly for infection. After the respirator is disconnected, should this other care be continued? Consider the
analogy between the respirator treatment and the feeding of a
terminal patient. Both are procedures which prolong the life
of a terminally ill patient without offering a hope of improvement. Both could be disconnected without actively inflicting
deadly harm into the patient's body (as by a drug injection),
resulting in the patient's death from natural causes. Recognizing
these analogies, it is still logical to conclude that Quinlan does not
90. 70 N.J. 10, 51-52, 355 A.2d 647, 669-70 (1976).
91. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the United States Supreme

Court held that a married couple could not be criminally punished for
purchasing or using contraceptives because such actions were within
their right of privacy. Furthermore, the Court implied that the person

who sold the contraceptives could not be subject to criminal sanctions

because he was merely facilitating the couple's exercise of their constitutionally protected right of privacy. Id. at 485.
92. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
94. See Symposium-Euthanasia,27 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1975).
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stand for authorization to terminate the feeding of a hopeless patient. Had the Quinlan court intended that all treatment
(including feeding) of Karen be stopped, it undoubtedly would
have so stated. The Quinlan decision is, by its terms, limited
to the termination of extraordinary forms of treatment. Feeding
a patient is a natural, as opposed to an artificial treatment and
therefore would be classified as an ordinary form of treatment
which under medical standards is not to be discontinued, even
after Quinian'smodification of the medical standards.9 5
Finally, the Quinlan court arguably extends the right of
privacy rationale too far by allowing third parties to assert the
right on behalf of incompetent patients. Whether future courts
will agree that an individual's right of privacy can be exercised
by other persons remains to be seen. A much stronger case for
delegation can be made where the terminal patient has executed
a "living will," an attested document in which the patient
requests that he not be kept alive by extraordinary means. 96
Third parties who then discontinue such treatment would merely
be effectuating the request of the patient pursuant to his right
of privacy.
While Quinlan is undoubtedly a significant development in
the law of euthanasia, its holding should affect only one distinct
portion of that law. Quinlan represents one notable position
above all others in that it allows persons other than the patient
to make the decision to terminate the patient's life-support
treatment. However, at the present time, it appears unlikely
that the case could be interpreted to sanction all forms of
euthanasia, including active euthanasia. 97
The Quinlan decision is based on the constitutional issues
raised under the right of privacy doctrine. However, the case
did not thoroughly develop other traditional issues concerning
physicians' civil liability in tort for acts of euthanasia. These
other issues encompass the concept of consent in its various
forms, such as third party and informed consent. The remainder
of this article will concern itself with these issues.
95. See Louisell, Euthanasiaand Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing,
22 CATn. U.L. Rxv. 723 (1973).
96. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
97. "Active euthanasia" in the context of this statement, means affirmative acts other than merely unplugging a life support mechanism.
See text accompanying note 3 supra. The reason that the Quinlan reasoning is not readily extendable to active euthanasia involves the nature
of the conduct necessary to perform active euthanasia, i.e., the affirmative introduction of a death-dealing agent into the life-streams of the patient. It is submitted that, on a purely emotional level, the unplugging
of a respirator (itself an extraordinarymeans of treatment) is less objectionable to the sensibilities than the act of injecting a lethal drug into the
patient's veins.
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Civm LIABILITY
A physician may be exposed to civil liability for wrongful
death as a result of performing acts of euthanasia. In the examination of civil liability, the standard of care which the physician
owes his patient becomes an important consideration.9 To determine if the physician deviates from this standard in arriving at
the euthanasia decision, and if so, to what extent, the reach of the
patient's consent must be considered. The factors implicit in a
valid, informed consent and related questions merit equal discussion.
Consent
The physician has a duty to possess that skill and knowledge
of an average physician in the community and to exercise reasonable care in using that skill in treating his patient.9 9 However,
even if he complies fully with this duty, the physician may yet
be subject to civil liability. In Mohr v. Williams,10 0 a physician
was held civilly liable for performing a successful operation upon
his patient's left ear to remove a diseased condition. The court
held the physician liable for battery even though the operation
had been performed with the requisite degree of skill and care
since the patient had not consented to the operation and because
no emergency endangering the patient's life was presented by
the left ear's condition. 10 1
This case illustrates the importance of the patient's consent
to treatment administered to him by his physician. Thus, even
when the physician satisfies his duty of care to the patient,
liability for intentional acts to which the patient does not consent
may still attach. Conversely, in most cases the patient's consent to the treatment will absolve the physician from civil
liability. 0 2
This concept of consent applies in the euthanasia situation
as well, albeit with certain modifications. The role of patient
consent in this area will first be considered in a negative sense,
represented by those situations where the patient refuses medical
treatment when it is necessary to save his life.'0 3 The courts
have not fully agreed whether a physician must administer life98. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
99. Id.

100. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
101. However, because the operation was performed with reasonable
skill and care and was a success, the court awarded the patient only minimal damages. Id.
102. "The consent of the person damaged will ordinarily avoid liabil-

ity for the intentional interference with person or property."
LAW OF TORTS § 18

(4th ed. 1971).

103. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.

PROSSER,
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saving treatment irrespective of his patient's refusal to consent thereto. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College10 4 involved a patient who was suffering from a ruptured
ulcer and had lost nearly two-thirds of her blood supply. The
patient was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses and because
of her religious beliefs refused the blood transfusion necessary
to save her life. The hospital sought a judicial order permitting
the transfusion over the patient's refusal. In justifying its order
compelling the transfusion, the court distinguished the case
before it from the "question of whether the state should intervene to reweigh the relative values of life and death, after the
individual has weighed them for himself and found life wanting.
[The patient here] wanted to live."'10 5 The court discussed the
legal position of the hospital and the doctors, and went on to cast
doubt on the vitality of a patient's consent which would result
in his or her death:
It is not certain that [the patient] had any authority to put the
It is not
hospital and its doctors to this impossible choice ....
clear just where a patient would derive her authority to command
her doctor to treat her under limitations which would produce
death. The patient's counsel suggests that this authority is part
of constitutionally protected liberty. But neither the principle
that life and liberty are inalienable rights, nor the principle of
liberty of religion, provides an easy answer to the question
whether the state can prevent martyrdom.' 0 6
However, the main factor which caused the court to issue its
order compelling the transfusion was not the inability of the
patient to refuse life-saving treatment. The court regarded the
situation as an emergency in which there was no time to pause
and disinterestedly consider competing interests. The situation
required quick action, and in the final analysis the court decided
10 7
to resolve the dilemma "on the side of life.'
Georgetown has not been followed unanimously; indeed, the
108
Following
authorities are almost evenly split on this matter.
Georgetown were In re Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical
Center'0 9 and Collins v. Davis.11 0 In Long Island Medical Center,
the court appointed a guardian who was permitted to consent to a
necessary operation on a patient who had gangrene, in spite of
104. 331 F.2d 1000, reh. denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964).
105. Id. at 1009. Before issuing the order, Wright, J., had conferred
with the patient, asking her whether she would accept the transfusion.
The patient had indicated that, should the court order the transfusion, the
matter would be "out of her hands." From this, it appears, the judge inferred that the patient "wanted to live."
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1010.
108. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
109. 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1973).
110. 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1964).
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the patient's protests against the operation. Collins involved a
slightly different situation-the patient was unable to give his
consent to a necessary operation because he was in a coma. However, the patient's wife having refused to consent to the operation
for reasons the court found to be medically unsound, the court
ordered the operation to proceed.
On the other hand, there have been a number of cases
contrary to Georgetown, including In re Brook's Estate."' In
Erickson v. Dilgard,112 the court found that an adult patient
had the right to refuse a blood transfusion "even if medical
opinion was to the effect that patient's decision not to accept
blood was just about the taking of patient's own life," and even
though suicide was prohibited by New York's criminal stat15
utes. 1 3 In re Osborne' 4 and Petition of Nemser" are to the
16
same effect.'
Arguably, a patient's refusal to consent to life-saving treatment is not really consent at all. The different considerations
which exist in the area of "true consent," i.e., when the patient
affirmatively consents to measures which will end his life, are
complex, and best arrived at by examining two factors: the doctrine of informed consent, and the concept of third party consent
on behalf of the patient.
Informed Consent
It is settled in most instances that a patient's consent to
treatment will be a defense to the physician who renders that
treatment with reasonable care and skill." 7 However, in order
118
Essentially,
to be valid, this consent must be informed.
informed consent involves two elements: the patient must be
made aware of the risks involved in the treatment, and he must
assent thereto. 119 Disclosure of risks commonly known to the
120
patient is unnecessary; only material risks must be disclosed.
111.
112.
113.
114.

32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
Id.
294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1972).

115. 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1966).
116. See generally Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Life-Saving Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REv, 860 (1965).
117. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
118. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J.
1632 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Informed Consent]. Part of the rationale behind the informed consent concept involves the patient's right to
determine when he will die. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972);
Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971). Obviously,
what qualifies as a "material risk" differs from situation to situation.
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The elements of informed consent are concisely stated in the lead121
ing modern case of Natanson v. Kline:
[T]he proper rule of law to determine whether a patient has
given an intelligent consent to a proposed form of treatment by
a physician ....compels disclosure by the physician in order to
assure that an informed consent of the patient is obtained. The
duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable [physician] would make under
the same or similar circumstances .... So long as the disclosure
is sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physician's choice
of plausible courses should not be called into question if it
appears, all circumstances considered, that the physician was
motivated only by the patient's best therapeutic interests and
he proceeded as competent medical men would have done in a
22
similar situation.'

Does this concept of informed consent have validity in the
area of euthanasia? Note that the physician is held to a continuing duty to disclose all pertinent information to the patient.
It can be argued that this duty also compels disclosure to the
patient that, in the physician's professional opinion, the patient
is suffering from a terminal affliction from which there is little
or no hope of recovery. Whether a reasonable physician under
the circumstances would make such a disclosure is open to some
question. On the one hand, such disclosure might not be in the
patient's "best therapeutic interests," causing him to suffer
extreme depression and "give up on life.' 123 Furthermore, the
practical effect of such a disclosure by the physician may be to
put the physician himself in a bad light, as if admitting that any
further care would prove fruitless. Conversely, the situation of
many terminal patients is such that impending death is obvious.
In these cases, it may indeed be in the "best therapeutic interests"
of the patient, especially psychologically, that the physician
24
candidly disclose the patient's condition to him.
Any solution to this dilemma must turn on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Factors influencing the
decision to disclose include the intensity of the patient's pain and
suffering, whether because of this pain he is able to fully comprehend the nature of the disclosure, and the particular patient's
psychological attributes. 25 In coming to any disclosure decision the physician must consider all these factors, and act as a
reasonable physician would under the circumstances.
121. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).

122. Id. at 409-10, 350 P.2d at 1106. See also Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).

123. See Survey, supra note 40.
124. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.

92 (1914).

125. See generally Informed Consent, supra note 118.
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At this point, it must be noted that the physician's act of
informing the patient of his condition is merely a preliminary
step in the euthanasia decision. Mere disclosure to the patient
of his impending death does not in itself subject the physician
to civil liability. Only after the patient relies on the disclosure
and consents to the act or non-act of euthanasia does the question
of liability arise. Disclosure is a vital part of the patient's
informed consent, and this consent may be a defense open to
the physician against civil liability for euthanasia. 12
Third Party Consent
An additional complexity in the area of consent arises when
the patient is unable to give his consent because he is incompetent, unconscious, or a minor. In Collins v. Davis,'27 the
patient was in a coma and his wife refused to give consent on
his behalf to a life-saving operation. The court refused to abide
by this "third party refusal" and ordered the operation to take
place, distinguishing Erickson v. Dilgard128 on the grounds that
the latter case involved the patient himself refusing the operation. Thus, it appears that third parties may be denied the right
to refuse treatment on behalf of the incompetent patient. However, it does not appear that a similar denial occurs when third
parties are called upon to consent on behalf of the patient to
treatment.
As a general rule, the physician does not have a duty to disclose information to an incompetent patient concerning his condition. 129 In Cobbs v. Grant,'30 the California Supreme Court
discussed this rule:
A patient should be denied the opportunity to weigh the risks
only where it is evident he cannot evaluate the data, as for
example, where there is an emergency or the patient is a child
or incompetent.' 31
The court further discussed who should bear the responsibility
when the patient is unable to evaluate the data himself, holding
that "the authority to consent is transferred to the patient's legal
guardian or closest available relative."'1 32 Another case involving the same point is Bonner v. Moran.1 33 There, the court
stated:
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See text accompanying note 102 supra.
44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1964).
44 Misc. 2d 27 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
See Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 1652.
8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
Id. at 238, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
Id.
126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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We think there can be no doubt that a surgical operation is a
technical battery, regardless of its results, and is excusable only
when there is express or implied consent by the patient; . . .
[G]enerally speaking, the rule has been considered to be that a
surgeon has no legal right to operate
upon a child without the
13 4
consent of his parents or guardian.
Thus, the rule is that when the patient's own consent is legally
invalid because of incompetency or because -he is a minor or
unconscious, the physician is protected if he secures consent from
one legally responsible for the patient's well-being.
Another problem for the physician in this area of third party
consent involves the determination of whether the patient is in
fact incompetent. 135 The Washington Supreme Court faced this
precise issue in Grannum v. Berard.136 Recognizing that competency was at all times a question of fact for the jury, the court
stated that the law will presume competency, and the burden
of proving incompetency is that of "clear, cogent and convincing
evidence."' 1 7 The factors which indicate competency focus on
the patient's ability to understand his situation and the risks and
alternatives inherent therein. The logic of the patient's decision
is not itself a factor to be considered, because once deemed com1 38
petent and informed, the decision rests in his hands.
There are serious difficulties with trying to equate the cases
involving the consent of third parties to curative medical treatment with the notion of allowing third parties to consent on
behalf of the patient to life-ending actions. In the former instance, the third party is consenting to treatment which will
replace the "status quo," that is, to replace the patient's former
condition of good health. In the latter case, the third party
would be consenting to actions which would bring about a major
and permanent change. It is questionable whether anyone other
than the patient himself has the right to consent to such actions. An essential part of the rationale behind voluntary euthanasia involves the preservation of the terminal patient's con13 9
trol over his own destiny.
The "voluntariness" of voluntary euthanasia would be
infringed upon if third parties were allowed to consent to
134. Id. at 122.
135. This problem does not occur when the patient is a minor. In such
cases, reference must be made to the applicable statute stating the age
at which an individual becomes competent to enter into legal transactions. If the particular individual has reached this age, he may give a
valid consent and is not legally incompetent.
136. 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
137. Id. at 306, 422 P.2d at 814.
138. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105
N.E. 92 (1914).
139. See Informed Consent, supra note 118. See also Szasz, Symposium on the Aging Poor,23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 45 (1972).

1976]

Euthanasia: The Physician's Liability

euthanasia on behalf of the terminal patient. Yet, the holding
of the recent Quinlan case 1 40 would seem to condone just such
a practice. Karen Quinlan herself has never consented to the
unplugging of her respirator, but the New Jersey Supreme Court
is willing to permit her father, as legal guardian, to consent in
her stead. This holding represents the first major decision sanctioning euthanasia, and does so without regard to the expressed
wishes of the patient, although under the circumstances it was
impossible to obtain the patient's opinion.14 In regard to the
physician's civil liability for acts of euthanasia, the Quinlan case
represents a significant relaxation of the prior law. By following
the specified consent procedure, a physician who disconnects a
terminal patient's life-support systems thereby hastening death
will avoid civil liability. While this form of passive euthanasia
is apparently condoned, it seems that legal authorization of active
euthanasia is still outside the permissive sphere of the law after
Quinlan.
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CHANGES
IN THE LAW OF EUTHANASIA

Death has long been a "taboo" subject in Western Society. 142 Other than prohibiting its inducement, society has
generally shunned all critical analysis of death. Largely because
of this "sociological frigidity," until recently, there has been little
action taken to legalize euthanasia. It seems an anomaly, as one
writer suggests, that "the use of drugs to relieve pain, although
but the administration
accelerating death, is legally permissible,
143
of drugs to induce death is not.'
However, Within the last five years a number of state legislatures have considered bills designed to legalize some forms of
euthanasia." 4 For the most part, the subject matter of this legislation includes the authorization of voluntary-passive euthanasia 4r and active euthanasia if the patient himself consented. 1'6
Some states have suggested provisions for third party consent
when the patient is unable to give his personal consent. 147 Im140. See text accompanying notes 50-97 supra.
141. The court admitted and considered evidence that Karen had told
her mother that she wanted to die if such a situation ever occurred.
142. E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1973).
143. Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 235, 242 (1972).
144. See Proposed Euthanasia Statutes: A Philosophical and Legal
Analysis, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Statutes].
145. See Proposed Statutes, supra note 144. "Passive" in this sense includes disconnecting life support mechanisms as well as omissions of

medical treatment.

146. Id.

147. Id.
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plicit in the legislative considerations, is the requirement that the
patient be suffering from a terminal affliction, i.e., "a serious
physical disability which is diagnosed as terminal and incurable,
from which there is no expectation of regaining health.' 148 Although the attending physician makes the initial determination
of the patient's condition, most of the legislative proposals require additional verification of the patient's condition by other
14
physicians appointed by the hospital for that purpose.
Such proposed legislation does indicate, however, that lawmakers are beginning seriously to consider statutory changes to
the current state of the law on euthanasia. 150 The potential
impact of these propositions, on the physician's liability in this
area is significant. They would effectively relieve the medical
profession of the danger of legal action in a large number of euthanasia situations. The legislation would allow the patient
rather than the physician to assume the role of primary decisionmaker, providing "a vehicle for individual choice; it would also
protect one who would not choose to elect the remedy."' '51
Equally prevalent are strong arguments against any form
of euthanasia. First, euthanasia involves the taking of life, and
an essential policy of society is the protection of life. This policy
of protecting life is reflected in the criminal statutes of all fifty
states, which punish the intentional taking of another's life without lawful justification.
Second, the possibility always exists for erroneous diagnoses
of a patient's condition. One noted authority who expounds this
argument questions whether the potentially premature and unnatural death of one individual is worth relieving the pain and
suffering of any number of other individuals. 52 Another consideration closely related to this argument is the fact that medical science might find a cure for the patient's condition in time
53
to save his life.'
Third, and perhaps most significant is the "wedge theory."
This position concerns the implications of legalizing euthanasia,
contending that the permission of euthanasia, a death-oriented
concept, would open the door to other practices such as killing
148. Id. at 131.
149. Id.
150. Id. See also Note, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy,
39 ALBANY L. REV. 826 (1975).
151. Note, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy, 39 ALBANY L.
REV. 826, 835 (1975).
152. See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed Mercy Killing Legislation, 42 MiNN. L. REV. 969 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Kamisar].
153. See Vodiga, Euthanasia and the Right to Die-Moral,Ethical and
Legal Perspectives,51 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1974).
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those individuals whom society has found to be "worthless."', 54
Consider the effect of legalized euthanasia on a society concerned
with the preservation of life. One author has suggested the following changes in values which might materialize:
Contrast the attitudes and manners which the motive of relieving
pain engenders, with those likely consequent upon a grim determination to kill. If the purpose were explicitly to kill, would
not there be a profound difference in the very way one would
grasp the syringe, the look in the eye, the words that might be
spoken or withheld, those subtle admixtures of fear and hope
that haunt the death-bed scene? And would not the consequences be compounded at least for the physician as he killed
one such patient after another? The line between civilized and
savage in men is fine enough without jeopardizing it with
euthanasia.

.

.

. The line might well not be maintainable under

a regime of direct intentional killing. 16
CONCLUSION

In summary, there are persuasive arguments both for and
against euthanasia. The finality of the patient's affliction, his
right to determine the time of his death, 156 and the expense
and hardship to his loved ones are persuasive contentions for the
legalization of at least some forms of euthanasia. Conversely,
the sanctity of life in all forms, 157 the danger of mistaken diagnoses or the possibility of recovery, and the specter of extending
"mercy-killing" beyond the realm of the terminally ill patient
all pose reasoned arguments against euthanasia.
Caught in the middle of this moral and legal dilemma is the
physician. His involvement in the euthanasia decision is deep
and his concern in the controversy correspondingly great. The
recent trend of the law, as evidenced by the growing number
154. Proponents of the wedge theory use historical examples to illustrate their point, such as the situation which existed in Nazi Germany:
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the
basic attitude of physicians. It started with the acceptance of the
attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing
as a life not worthy of being lived. This attitude in its early stages
confined itself to the severely and chronically sick. Gradually the
sphere of those to be included . . . was enlarged to encompass the

socially unproductive, the idealogically unwanted, the radically unwanted, and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize
that the infinitely small wedged-in level from which this entire trend
of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the non-rehabilitable sick.
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Kamisar, supra note 152 at 115-16.
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of proposed statutes advocating the legalization of euthanasia in
some forms, and by the Quinlan case, promises some relief to
physicians from both criminal and civil liability. However, exact
boundaries of the law have yet to be clearly defined and strong
arguments may yet be made against involuntary and active forms
of euthanasia. It does appear that as to passive euthanasia, the
law is currently lending a sympathetic ear toward the physician's
plight.
Virgil Thurman

